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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Included among the treasury decisions handed down since the last issue
of The Journal of Accountancy are two or more that are of unusual
interest, although there is nothing startling in the conclusions reached.
These will be briefly discussed in later paragraphs; but the one matter in
which all will find interest is the decision of the United States supreme court
relative to taxing as income profits earned in the sale of capital assets.
This decision was given by Justice Clark and is well worth careful
reading and thoughtful consideration.
It does not sustain the position taken by Judge Thomas, of the United
States district court, that there is a distinction between income earned in
the operation of the business and that arising from transactions in the socalled capital assets used in the business. The decision of the supreme
court is quite in line with the position taken by the accounting profession
generally and will set at rest the idea that profits realized on investments
are capital instead of income.
Bringing these suits to test this theory has been generally beneficial in
abolishing the rigid rule that the excess of sales price over the fair value
at March 1, 1913, of property sold shall be considered taxable income. This
rule has been modified, as pointed out in the April number of The Journal
of Accountancy, so that the excess of sales price over the fair value at
March 1, 1913, shall be income when the said fair value equals or exceeds
the original cost of the property sold. This modification is based upon sound
principles.
It is regrettable that the decision of the United States supreme court is
not available for printing this month, but it will be included in the June
issue.
Treasury decision 3137 will be found to contain a thought that occurred
to many of us at the time of our first reading of provisions of the excessprofits-tax law, appertaining to the computation of the graduated scale of
excess-profits taxes. It will be remembered how many puzzling problems
the language of the act brought to the harassed accountant when he first
attacked the work of making a return.
This decision sets at rest any doubts there may have remained as to the
proper method of computing excess-profits taxes.
Treasury decision 3138 treats of income arising from community of
interest of husband and wife in property in certain states of the union.
Treasury decision 3147 is based upon a decision of the district court of
the United States for the district of Minnesota in the case of Great North
ern Railway Company versus E. J. Lynch, collector.
This decision appertains to the corporation excise-tax law of 1909 and
in some of its conclusions seems to conflict with the decision of the United
States supreme court in the Brewster versus Walsh case. This latter case,
however, was brought as a test of the revenue act of 1916, after the six
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teenth amendment to the constitution had been adopted, which may account
for the apparent conflict.
The other treasury decisions printed in this month’s issue of The
Journal of Accountancy relate to estate taxes and, while worthy of
comment, are printed without, because of the limitations of space of an
issue in which income-tax matters are requiring perhaps more than their
proper share.
(T. D. 3137—March 2, 1921.)
War excess-profits tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
Computation of Tax—Deductions.
The deduction provided for by section 203 of the revenue act of 1917
must be taken from net income as a part of the computation of the tax,
and not before the computation.
A portion of the decision of the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of New York, dated November 18, 1920, in the com
bined cases of Greenport Basin & Construction Co. v. United States and
Ira M. Young v. United States, is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned. Only that portion of the opinion
involving the computation of the war excess-profits tax is published.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Greenport Basin & Construction Co. v. United States and Ira M. Young v.
United States.
[Nov. 18, 1920.]
Garvin, District Judge: These are two actions, each to recover an
amount of excess-profits tax paid by the plaintiff under the revenue act
approved October 3, 1917; plaintiff claims that the regulations adopted by
the treasury department, under which the tax was paid, go beyond the plain
intent and meaning of the law. The cases come before the court on de
murrers, which involve the same questions of law and are on the following
grounds:
1. That it appears upon the face of the said complaint that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
2. That the complaint does not set out facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action against the defendant named herein.
3. That this court has no jurisdiction of this defendant.
Only the first two need be considered, the defendant having abandoned
the third.
*******
The second ground of demurrer brings us to the consideration of
whether the method of computing the tax was proper. Section 201 of the
revenue act of 1917, which does not appear to have been judicially con
strued, reads as follows:
That in addition to the taxes under existing law and under this act
there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid for each taxable year
upon the income of every corporation, partnership, or individual a tax
(hereinafter in this title referred to as the tax) equal to the following
percentages of the net income:
Twenty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of the
deduction (determined as hereinafter provided) and not in excess of fifteen
per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year;
Twenty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
fifteen per centum and not in excess of twenty per centum of such capital;
Thirty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
twenty per centum and not in excess of twenty-five per centum of such
capital;
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Forty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of
twenty-five per centum and not in excess of thirty-three per centum of such
capital; and
Sixty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of thirtythree per centum of such capital.
Under articles 16 and 17 of regulations No. 41 issued by the commis
sioner of internal revenue, which describe in detail the method of com
puting the excess-profits tax, the deductions have been made, not from
the net income before the computation of the tax, but as a part of the
computation. These articles have no binding force if they alter, amend,
or extend the statute.—Merrill vs. Jones (106 U. S. 466). It is necessary
therefore, to consider the language of the act in order to ascertain what
was intended by congress.
According to section 201 of the revenue act of 1917, supra, a tax is
imposed at the rate of 20 per cent. upon “the amount of the net income
in excess of the deduction and not in excess of fifteen per centum of the
invested capital for the taxable year,” etc. While the entire section is not
free from ambiguity, the court is of the opinion that, having in mind the
necessity of adopting a construction in accordance with the intent of con
gress when the act was adopted, that urged by the government must prevail.
If it had been the purpose of congress to have the tax computed as plaintiff
contends, the first paragraph of section 201 would have provided for the
levy of a tax “equal to the following percentages of the net income less
the deduction determined as hereinafter provided,” making no mention of
any deduction in the following paragraph.
If the section as it now reads is carefully analyzed, it is apparent that
the amount of the net income which is to be taxed at the rate of 20 per
cent. is not more than 15 per cent. of the invested capital for the taxable
year. But not so much of the net income as is represented by such 15
per cent. is to be so taxed because there must first be allowed the deduction.
The following computation in the case of the Greenport Basin & Con
struction Co. tax, under regulations No. 41, shows how the actual wording
of the act is followed under regulations No. 41 which are here under attack:
Greenport Case.—Computation of Greenport Basin & Construction Co. tax
under Regulations No. 41.

Invested capital ............. $215,615.55
Income ........................... 76,361.20
Deduction ....................... 18,093.08

Deduction estimated as follows:
7% of $215,615.55=... $15,093.08
Specific deduction=...
3,000.00

18,093.08
Schedule IV, Revenue Act 1917.—Classes of income.
Balance
subject
Over—
But not over— Income Deduction to tax Rate
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(5)
(1)
$0.00
15% inv. cap. $32,342.33 $18,093.08 $14,249.25 20%
15% inv. cap. 20% inv. cap. 10,780.77
None 10,780.77 25%
20% inv. cap. 25% inv. cap. 10,780.77
None 10,780.77 35%
25% inv. cap. 33% inv. cap. 17,249.24
None 17,249.24 45%
....................
5,208.09
33% inv. cap.
None 5,208.09 60%
.................... 76,361.20
Total

Amount
of tax
(7)
$2,849.85
2,695.19
3,773.27
7,762.15
3 124 85
20,205.31

Pro rata for fiscal years: 5/6 of $20,205.31 = $16,837.76.
It is interesting to note also that, as congress continued to enact legisla
tion designed to raise monies for war purposes, the language employed be
came more specific. That part of the revenue act of 1918 which fixed the
rates of the tax upon the percentages of the net income is worded sub
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stantially like the act under consideration, but has an additional paragraph
which reads as follows:
(d) In any case where the full amount of the excess-profit credit is not
allowed under the first bracket of subdivision (a) or (b), by reason of the
fact that such credit is in excess of 20 per centum of the invested capital,
the part not so allowed shall be deducted from the amount in the second
bracket.
While it is quite true that this is not controlling upon the construction
of the act now before the court, it illustrates admirably how it would be
quite possible for the full amount of the excess-profit credit to be in excess
of 15 per cent. of the invested capital, in which event no provision would
be made for allowing that part of the credit so in excess, under the law of
1917.
If the foregoing conclusions are correct, the demurrers must be sustained.
(T. D. 3138—March 3, 1921.)
Income and estate taxes—Husband and Wife—Community property—
Opinion of Attorney General.
1. In Washington, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Louisiana and Nevada
the husband and wife domiciled therein, in rendering separate income-tax
returns, may each report as gross income, one-half of the income which
under the laws of the respective states becomes, simultaneously with its
receipt, community property; this is not based upon any statute enacted
subsequent to March 1, 1913, and applies under income-tax acts prior to the
revenue act of 1918.
2. In Washington, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Louisiana and Nevada
there should be included in gross estate, in computing the estate tax of a
deceased spouse, one-half only of the community property of husband and
wife domiciled therein; this is not based upon any statute enacted subse
quent to March 1, 1913, and applies under estate-tax acts prior to the revenue
act of 1918.
(T. D. 3147—March 11, 1921.)
Corporation excise tax—Act of August 5, 1909—Decision of court.
1. Income—Obligations of Taxpayer Outlawed and Written Off Dur
ing Taxable Year.
The amount of obligations of a railroad corporation carried on the books
as liabilities, which became outlawed and were therefore written off during
the taxable years 1910 and 1911, represented profit to the company which
was properly included in its net income for the year in which so written off.
2. Same—Property Sold for More Than Its Value January 1, 1909,
But Less Than Purchase Price Prior Thereto.
The excess of the sale price over the value on January 1, 1909, of prop
erty acquired prior to that date, and sold during 1909 and 1910, was income
for the year in which received, although the sale price was less than the
purchase price of the property.
3. Same—Property Sold for Amount Equivalent to Value January 1,
1909, But Greater Than Purchase Price Prior Thereto.
The sale in 1910 and 1911 of property acquired prior to January 1, 1909,
or an amount equivalent to its market value on that date, but in excess of
its purchase price, did not result in income for the purposes of the corpo
ration excise tax of August 5, 1909.
In the District Court of the United States for the District of
Minnesota, Third Division. No. 797.
Great Northern Railway Co., plaintiff, v. E. J. Lynch, collector of internal
revenue, defendant.
[January 10, 1921.]
Booth, District Judge: The above action came on regularly for trial on
the 11th day of March, 1918, each party appearing by its respective counsel.
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From the admissions and stipulations of the parties then and there made
and filed, and from the pleadings of the parties, the court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT.

1. That plaintiff is a corporation duly formed and existing under the laws
of the state of Minnesota, and has a principal office at St. Paul in Ramsey
County in said state.
2. That E. J. Lynch is, and was, on all the dates hereinafter mentioned,
collector of internal revenue for the district of Minnesota, being duly com
missioned as such pursuant to the laws of the United States.
3. That on or about the 16th day of September, 1913, the United States
commissioner of internal revenue, presuming to act by virtue of due legal
authority conferred by the statutes of the United States congress, assessed
against the plaintiff as a corporation having capital stock and alleged to
be engaged in business in Minnesota, an additional internal revenue special
excise tax of $2,530.93, alleged to be due from said corporation to the
United States for the year ended December 31, 1910, and an additional
internal revenue special excise tax of $4,176.09, alleged to be due from said
corporation to the United States for the year ended December 31, 1911,
under the act of congress of August 5, 1909. That the lists upon which
said assessments appeared were thereafter duly transmitted to the de
fendant and defendant thereupon made a formal demand for the payment
of said tax so assessed.
4. That under date of September 26, 1913, the plaintiff filed with the
defendant and with the United States commissioner of internal revenue a
claim for the remission and abatement of said additional internal revenue
special excise taxes.
5. That on or about the 18th day of October, 1913, the plaintiff paid to
the defendant the amount of said additional assessment, but at the same
time filed with defendant and with the United States commissioner of
internal revenue writings stating that each of said payments were made
under protest, and with a denial of any legal obligation of liability, and
solely for the purpose of avoiding the imposition of a penalty and distraint
and sale of property, and reserving to the plaintiff all rights for the re
covery of the amounts of each of said payments.
6. That thereafter and on or about the 18th day of October, 1913, the
plaintiff filed with the defendant and with the United States commissioner
of internal revenue claims for the refunding of $1,734.73 of the additional
tax assessed for the year 1910 as aforesaid, and of $1,361.46, of the addi
tional tax paid for the year 1911 as aforesaid.
7. That on or about the 11th day of November, 1913, the deputy United
States commissioner of internal revenue denied plaintiff’s claim for refund
of said 1910 taxes, except as to $101.98 thereof, and that on or about the
20th day of November, 1913, the said deputy United States commissioner
denied plaintiff’s claim for refund of said 1911 taxes, except as to $57.68
thereof. That plaintiff has still outstanding the balance of said 1910 taxes
amounting to $1,632.75, and the balance of said 1911 taxes amounting to
the sum of $1,303.79, or an aggregate of $2,936.53.
8. That of said additional tax of $2,936.53, assessed and withheld from
plaintiff as aforesaid, the sum of $70.01 consisted of an assessment of 1
per cent. upon the sum of $7,001.32, entered upon the books of the plaintiff
as profit during the year 1910, and consisting of unpaid obligations of plain
tiff accruing prior to January 1, 1909, and which were carried as liabilities
until they became outlawed, and were then written off of plaintiff’s books
as aforesaid, and the sum of $44.88 consisted of an assessment of 1 per
cent. upon the sum of $4,488, entered upon the books of plaintiff as profit
during the year 1911, and consisting of unpaid obligations of plaintiff
accruing prior to January 1, 1909, and which were carried as liabilities
until they became outlawed and were then written off of plaintiff’s books in
1911.
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9. That of said additional tax of $2,936.53 assessed and withheld from
plaintiff as aforesaid, the sum of $376.61 consisted of an assessment of 1
per cent. upon receipts of $37,660.67, received by plaintiff as proceeds of the
sale of 300 shares of stock of the Swan River Logging Co. purchased on
September 23, 1899, for $300,000 and entered on its books October 10, 1908,
at a value of $75,000. On November 1, 1909, plaintiff received $95,000 for
said stock and the excess over said amount of $75,000 being $20,000, was
assessed to plaintiff as income for the year 1909. The said sum of $37,660.67 represents additional proceeds of the sale of said stock received in
1910. No further evidence was offered as to the value of said stock on
December 31, 1909.
10. That the balance of said sum of $2,936.53 assessed and withheld as
aforesaid, to wit: the sum of $2,445.03 consisted of an assessment of 1 per
cent. upon $244,503.79, being a portion of receipts during the years 1910
and 1911 from sales of real estate, the total excess of selling price over
original cost of the same having been prorated over the period of owner
ship, and the said sum of $244,503.79 having been treated as the pro rata
proportion of said excess for the period since the act of 1909 became ef
fective. Said real estate had been purchased prior to 1909 and sold at a
profit as above stated during the years 1910 and 1911, the selling price in
all cases being exactly equal to the market value of said real estate as of
the 31st day of December, 1908.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

From the foregoing facts the court concludes as follows:
1. That the said sum of $2,445.03 referred to in finding No. 10, was
illegally and improperly assessed against and collected from the plaintiff,
and that it was paid by plaintiff under duress and protest, and that claim
for refund of said tax filed by plaintiff with the commissioner of internal
revenue as required by law was denied prior to the institution of this suit.
2. That the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant, E. J.
Lynch, as collector of internal revenue, for the said sum of $2,445.03, to
gether with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from
October 16, 1913, and for its cost herein.
3. That the items of the additional assessment mentioned in findings
Nos. 8 and 9 were properly and legally assessed and collected and the plain
tiff is not entitled to judgment against the defendant for or on account of
said items amounting to an aggregate of $491.50.
4. That the said sum of $2,445.03 was received by the defendant and
by him paid into the treasury of the United States in the performance of
his official duty, and that there was probable cause for his act, and that
he acted under the directions of the proper officer of the government, and
that no execution should issue against him, but that the amount to be
recovered should be provided for and paid out of the proper appropriation
from the treasury.
Done in open court this 10th day of January, 1921.
(T. D. 3150—April 2, 1921.)
Estate tax—Act of September 8, 1916, Title II—Decision of Supreme
Court.
1. Gross Estate—Conditions—Section 202 (a) Construed.
The conditions expressed in clause (a) of section 202, act of September
8, 1916, to the effect that the taxable estate must be (1) an interest of the
decedent at the time of his death, (2) which after his death is subject to
the payment of the charges against his estate and the expenses of its
administration, and (3) is subject to distribution as part of his estate, are
expressed conjunctively, and it would be inadmissible, in construing the
act, to read them as if prescribed disjunctively; hence, unless the three con
ditions are fulfilled, property involved does not become part of the gross
estate.
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2. Power of Appointment—Time of Creation and Excution.
Property passing under testamentary execution of a general power of
appointment created prior but executed subsequent to the passage of the act
of September 8, 1916, is not subject to the estate tax imposed by Title II
of such act.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the United States,
rendered February 28, 1921, in the case of the United States v. Stanley
Field, as executor of the estate of Kate Field, deceased, is published for
the information of internal revenue officers and others concerned.

Supreme Court of the United States. No. 442. October Term, 1920.
United States, appellant, v. Stanley Field, as executor of the estate of
Kate Field, deceased.
Appeal from the Court of Claims.
[Feb. 28, 1921.]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims sustaining a
claim for refund of an estate tax exacted under title II of the revenue act
of September 8, 1916, as amended by act of March 3, 1917 (ch. 463, 39 Stat,
756, 777; ch. 159, 39 Stat., 1000, 1002). It presents the question whether
the act taxed a certain interest that passed under testamentary execution of
a general power of appointment created prior but executed subsequent to
its passage.
The facts are as follows: Joseph N. Field, a citizen and resident of
Illinois, died April 29, 1914, leaving a will which was duly admitted to
probate in that State, and by which he gave the residue of his estate, after
payment of certain legacies, to trustees, with provision that one-third of
it should be set apart and held as a separate trust fund for the benefit of
his wife, Kate Field, the net income to be paid to her during life, and from
and after her death the net income of one-half of said share of the trust
estate to be paid to such persons and in such shares as she should appoint
by last will and testament. The trust was to continue until the death of
the last surviving grandchild of the testator who was living at the time of
his death, and at its termination the undistributed estate was to be divided
among named beneficiaries or their issue, per stirpes, in proportions speci
fied. Kate Field died April 29, 1917, a resident of Illinois, leaving a will
which was duly probated in that State, by which she executed the power
of appointment, directing that the income to which the power related should
be paid in equal shares to her children surviving at the date of the re
spective payments, the issue of any deceased child to stand in the place of
such deceased child. The collector of internal revenue, assuming to act
under the revenue act of 1916, as amended, and regulations issued by the
commissioner of internal revenue, included as a part of the gross estate of
Kate Field the appointed estate passing under her execution of the power;
and proceeded to assess and collect an estate tax based upon the net value
thereof, and amounting to $121,059.60. Her executor, having paid the tax
under protest, and having made a claim for refund which was considered
and rejected by the commissioner of internal revenue, brought this suit and
recovered judgment, from which the United States appeals.
The revenue act of 1916, in section 201 (39 Stat., 777), imposes a tax
equal to specified percentages of the value of the net estate “upon the trans
fer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage of this act.”
By section 203 (p. 778) the value of the net estate is to be determined by
subtracting from the value of the gross estate certain specified deductions.
The gross estate is to be valued as follows:
Sec. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be de
termined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
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(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of
his death which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges
against his estate and the expenses of its administration and is subject to
distribution as part of his estate.
(b) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair considera
tion in money or money’s worth. Any transfer of a material part of his
property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made
by the decedent within two years prior to his death without such a con
sideration shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made
in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title; * * *
The amendment of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat., 1002) pertains merely to
the rates, and need not be further considered?
The provision quoted from section 202 was construed by the treasury
department, in United States internal revenue regulations No. 37, relating
to estate taxes, revised May, 1917 (art. 11), as follows: “Property passing
under a general power of appointment is to be included as a portion of the
gross estate of a decedent appointor.”
No question being suggested as to the power of congress to impose a
tax upon the passing of property under testamentary execution of a power
of appointment created before but executed after the passage of the taxing
act—see Chanter v. Kelsey (205 U. S., 466, 473, 478-479) ; Knowlton v.
Moore (178 U. S., 41, 56-61)—the case involves merely a question of the
construction of the act. Applying the accepted canon that the provisions of
such acts are not to be extended by implication (Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S.,
151, 153), we are constrained to the view—notwithstanding the adminis
trative construction adopted by the treasury department—that the revenue
act of 1916 did not impose an estate tax upon property passing under a tes
tamentary execution of a general power of appointment.
The government seeks to sustain the tax under both clauses above quoted
from section 202.
The conditions expressed in clause (a) are to the effect that the taxable
estate must be (1) an interest of the decedent at the time of his death, (2)
which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his
estate and the expenses of its administration, and (3) is subject to distri
bution as part of his estate. These conditions are expressed conjunctively;
and it would be inadmissible, in construing a taxing act, to read them as if
prescribed disjunctively. Hence, unless the appointed interest fulfilled all
three conditions, it was not taxable under this clause.
The chief reliance of the government is upon the rule, well established
in England and followed generally, but not universally, in this country, that
where one has a general power of appointment either by deed or by will,
and executes the power, equity will regard the property appointed as part
of his assets for the payment of his creditors in preference to the claims of
his voluntary appointees. See Brandies v. Cochrane (112 U. S., 344, 352).'
The English cases are fully reviewed by the house of lords in O’Grady
v. Wilmot [1916] (2 A. C., 231, 246, et. seq.). Illustrative cases in the
American courts are Johnson v. Cushing, (15 N. H., 298, 307) ; Rogers v.
Hinton (62 N. C., 101, 105) ; Clapp v. Ingraham (126 Mass., 200, 202) ;
Knowles v. Dodge (1 Mack. [D. C.], 66, 72) ; Freeman v. Butters (94 Va.,
406, 411) ; Tallmadge v. Sill (21 Barb., 34, 51, et seq.) ; contra, per Gibson,
C. J., in Commonwealth v. Duffield (12 Pa., 277, 279-281) ; Pearce v. Lederer
(262 Fed., 993) ; affirmed, Lederer v. Pearce (266 Fed., 497).
It is tacitly admitted that the rule obtains in Illinois, and we shall so
assume.
But the existence of the power does not of itself vest any estate in the
1 The act was further amended Oct. 3, 1917 (ch. 63, 40 Stat., 300, 324); superseded
and repealed by act of Feb. 24, 1919 (ch. 18, 40 Stat., 1057, 1096, 1149).
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donee.—Collins v. Wickwire (162 Mass., 143, 144) ; Keays v. Blinn (234
Ill., 121, 124) ; Walker v. Treasurer (221 Mass., 600, 602-603) ; Shattuck v.
Burrage (229 Mass., 448, 451). See Carver v. Jackson (4 Pet., 1, 93).
Where the donee dies indebted, having executed the power in favor of
volunteers, the appointed property is treated as equitable, not legal, assets
of his estate.—Clapp v. Ingraham (126 Mass., 200, 203) ; Patterson Co. v.
Lawrence (83 Ga., 703, 707) ; and (in the absence of statute), if it passes
to the executor at all, it does so not by virtue of his office but as a matter
of convenience and because he represents the rights of creditors.—O’Grady
v. Wilmot [1916] (2 A. C., 231, 248-257) ; Smith v. Garey (2 Dev. & Bat.
Eq. [N. C.] 42, 49) ; Olney v. Balch (154 Mass., 318, 322) ; Emmons v.
Shaw (171 Mass., 410, 411) ; Hill v. Treasurer (229 Mass., 474, 477).
Where the power is executed, creditors of the donee can lay claim to the
appointed estate only to the extent that the donee’s own estate is insufficient
to satisfy their demands.—Patterson Co. v. Lawrence (83 Ga., 703, 708) ;
Walker v. Treasurer (221 Mass., 600, 602-603) ; Shattuck v. Burrage (229
Mass., 448, 452).
It is settled that (in the absence of statute), creditors have no redress
in case of a failure to execute the power.—Holmes v. Coghill (7 Ves., 499,
507; affirmed, 12 Ves., 206, 214-215); Gilman v. Bell (99 Ill., 144, 150;
Duncanson v. Manson (3 App. D. C., 260, 273).
And, whether the power be or be not exercised, the property that was
subject to appointment is not subject to distribution as part of the estate of
the donee. If there be no appointment, it goes according to the disposition
of the donor. If there be an appointment to volunteers, then, subject to
whatever charge creditors may have against it, it goes not to the next of kin
or the legatees of the donee, but to his appointees under the power.
It follows that the interest in question, not having been property of Mrs.
Field at the time of her death, nor subject to distribution as part of her
estate, was not taxable under clause (a).
We deem it equally clear that it was not within clause (b). That clause
is the complement of (a), and is aptly descriptive of a transfer of an in
terest in decedent’s own property in his lifetime, intended to take effect at
or after his death. It can not, without undue laxity of construction, be
made to cover a transfer resulting from a testamentary execution by de
cedent of a power of appointment over property not his own.
It would have been easy for congress to express a purpose to tax prop
erty passing under a general power of appointment exercised by a decedent
had such a purpose existed; and none was expressed in the act under con
sideration. In that of February 24, 1919, which took its place, the section
providing how the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be de
termined contains a clause precisely to the point (sec. 402 (e), 40 Stat.,
1097) : “To the extent of any property passing under a general power of
appointment exercised by the decedent (1) by will, or (2) by deed exe
cuted in contemplation of, or intended to take effect in possession or en
joyment at or after, his death, except,” etc. Its insertion indicates that
congress at least was doubtful whether the previous act included property
passing by appointment. See matter of Miller (110 N. Y., 216, 222) ;
matter of Harbeck (161 N. Y., 211, 217-218) ; United States v. Bashaw (50
Fed. 749, 754). The government contends that the amendment was made for
the purpose of clarifying rather than extending the law as it stood, and
cites a statement to that effect in the report of the house committee on
ways and means (House Doc. No. 1267, p. 101, 65th Cong., 2d sess.). It
is evident, however, that this statement was based upon the interpretation
of the act of 1916 adopted by the treasury department; the same report
proceeded to declare (p. 102) that “the absence of a provision including
property transferred by power of appointment makes it possible, by re
sorting to the creation of such a power, to effect two transfers of an
estate with the payment of only one tax”; and this, together with the fact
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that the committee proposed that the law be amended, shows that the treasury
construction was not treated as a safe reliance.
The tax in question being unsupported by the taxing act, the court of
claims was right in awarding reimbursement. Judgment affirmed.

(T. D. 3151—April 2, 1921.)
Estate tax—Act of September 8, 1916—Decision of court.
1. Transfer Effective at or after Death—Retroactive Operation of
Act.
The act of September 8, 1916, Title II, applies to a transfer made before
the passage of the act and intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death, where the transferrer died after the act took effect.
2. Constitutionality of Act.
The act of September 8, 1916, Title II, construed as applying to trans
fers made before its passage and intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after the death of a transferrer who dies after its passage,
is not unconstitutional.
The appended decision of the District Court of the United States for
the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in the case of
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco et al., executors, v. Wardell, collector,
is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.

District Court

of the United
California,

States for the Northern District of
Southern Division.
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, a corporation, and Albert Lachman, as
executor of the last will and testament of Henriette S. Lachman, deceased,
plaintiffs, v. Justus S. Wardell, United States collector of internal revenue
for the first district of California, defendant.
[No. 16220. Memorandum.]
Rudkin, District Judge: Section 201 of the act of September 8, 1916
(39 Stat., 777), imposes a tax upon the transfer of the net estate of every
decedent dying after the passage of the act, whether a resident or non
resident of the United States.
Section 202 provides:
That the value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or
personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated: * * *
(b) To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer, or with respect to which he has created a trust,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration
in money or money’s worth.
The value of the net estate is ascertained by making certain authorized
deductions from the value of the gross estate.
On the 31st day of May, 1901, Henriette S. Lachman executed a declara
tion of trust under the terms of which she assigned 7,475 shares of the
capital stock of S. & H. Lachman estate, of which she was the owner, to
her sons Albert Lachman and Henry Lachman, as trustees, to pay the
income from the stock to her during her life, and upon her death to
deliver the stock to certain relatives named in the trust deed. The grantor
in the trust deed died on the 14th day of November, 1916, and the present
suit was thereafter brought by her executors to recover the sum of $4,545.50
paid as tax on the above transfer, under protest.
Counsel for plaintiffs contends that the act should not be so construed
as to include transfers made prior to its passage, and that if so construed
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the act is unconstitutional and void. Both of these questions were de
termined adversely to the plaintiffs by the circuit court of appeals for the
eighth circuit in Schwab, executor, v. Doyle, not yet reported. In that case
the transfer was made in contemplation of death, whereas in the present
case the transfer was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death, but manifestly the same rule of construction will apply to
both provisions, and the same rule of constitutional validity. I entertain
no doubt that the act was intended to operate retrospectively, and a contrary
construction could only be justified on the principle that such a construction
would render the act unconstitutional. On the question of constitutionality
the decision of an appellate court should certainly raise a doubt as to the
invalidity of the act in the mind of a trial court, and without further dis
cussion the demurrer will be sustained.
Let an order be entered accordingly.
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